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RECENT CASES
New York, Minnesota, Missouri, and California.1 California has recently
reversed its position in Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.' - New York limits
its application to tort actions.13 However, Missouri and Illinois still refuse to
apply the doctrine to Federal Employers' Liability Act actions.1 4 The question
has not been raised in North Dakota.
By the decision in the instant case, the Minnesota court has overruled the
case of Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 15 which held that the doctrine
could not be applied in transitory actions brought by residents of foreign states.
It has thus alleviated the hardship to defendants" and the unfair burden to
local taxpayers,1 7 and has effectuated the result desired from the 1948
amendment.'s
JEROME J. MACK
INSURANCE - EFFECT OF NONLIABILITY CLAUSE UPON RIGHT TO CONTRIBU-
TION FROM TORTFEASOR'S INSURER - W, while a passenger in an automobile
owned and operated by her husband, sustained injuries in a car-train
collision. A suit against the Railroad Company and the husband as negligent
joint tortfeasors resulted in recovery of a judgment against both defendants
which was collected in full from the Railroad Company. In an attempt by the
latter to enforce its right of contribution against the husband's insurer, the
court held, that enforcement of such right was precluded by a provision
in the insurance policy absolving the insurer from all liability for injuries to
the insured or members of his household. Puller v. Puller, 110 A.2d 175
(Pa.1955).
11. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4, Committee on the Judiciary, on H. B.
1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
Supra note, 3 at 383, "A survey conducted by 51 leading railroads showed that during
a five year period ending in 1946, 2512 suits were filed outside the federal districts -n
which the accident occurred or in which the Plaintiff resided at the time of the accident
and that 92% of these suits were concentrated in the states of Illinois, New York, Min-
nesota, Missouri and California".
12. 268 P.2d 457 (Calif. 1954).
13. White v. Boston & M. Ry., 129 N. Y. S.2d 15 (1954); Wurnan v. Wabash By..
246 N. Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508 (1927); Gregonis v. Philadelphia R. C. & I. Co., 235 N. Y.
162, 139 N.E. 223 (1923).
14. See note'9 Supra; Wintersteen v. National Cooperage Co., 316 Ill. 95, 197 N.E.
578 (1935); Bright v. Wheelock 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W.2d 684 (1929).
15. 180 Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930).
16. Mooney v. Denver & R. G. W. By., Supra note 3; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 508 (1947); cf, Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923);
But see Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Kepner, supra note 5. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, supra note 3.
17. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152; Gulf
Oil Corp. N. Gilbert, supra note 16; ef. Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., supra note 16;
But see Baltimore & Ohio Ry v. Kepner, supra note 5.
18. See note 7 supra. If state courts do not invoke the doctrine when federal courts
must, the plaintiff when dismissed in the federal court may re-enter the jurisdiction through
the state courts, thus frustrating the purpose of the amendment.
The instant case also pointed out that actions brought by tourists who spend con-
siderable time in the state or by residents of border states shall not be disturbed. Maloney
v. New York, N. H. & H. By., 88 F.Supp. 568 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) suggested the following
for consideration in determining if the doctrine should be invoked: "(a) relative ease of
access to. source of proof; (b) availability of compulsory process for attendance of un-
willing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; (c) possibility of view
of premises, if such be appropriate; (d) all other practical problems that may make the
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." See Naughton v. Pennsylvania By.,
supra note 4 at 763.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW. REVIEW
Tort actions between husband and wife were forbidden at common law,1
first on the theory of unity of the spouses2, and later on the supposition that
domestic harmony wkould be thereby destroyed.3 Pennsylvania confirmed this
principle by enacting a statute declaratory of the common law. 4 Recognizing
that there is very little harmony left to preserve when one spouse is attempt-
ing to sue the other, many jurisdictions now allow such actions either by ex-
press statute, 5 or by liberal constructions of the Married Women's Acts.6
Refusing to assist a wrongdoer, the common law courts permitted no com-
tribution between wilful or negligent joint tortfeasors.7 A few states, including
Pennsylvania, have modified the common law rule to the extent of allowing
contribution where the tortious act is negligent as distinguished from inten-
tional.8 These courts proceed on the theory that it is inequitable for the
entire loss to be born by one tortfeasor who may have been selected by the
mere whim of the injured party or by his actual collusion with the other
wrongdoer.9 Generally however, even in these jurisdictions it is not held
that contribution will be allowed solely by virtue of the fact that there was
unity or concert of action between the negligent joint tortfeasors. It mustbe
shown in addition, that the joint tortfeasors are subject to common liability
to the injured party. Consequently, where tort actions between husband
and wife are prohibited, contribution is usually denied if one of the joint tort-
feasors is the spouse of the injured party, since tlhe essential ejement of com-
mon liability is lacking.1O Pennsylvania by statute, paradoxically provides
for contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors even thohgh the injured
party is the spouse of one of the liable parties and is thus prevented from
recovering from him directly."1
In jurisdictions allowing actions betwen husband wife it is usually held,
in the absence of a clause relieving the insurer from liability for-injuries to
members of the insured's family, that an insured who has been successfully
1. E.g. Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1056 (1930).
2. See, e.g., Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 AtI. 534, 535 (1927),.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953).
4. Pa. Stat. Tit. 48 §111 (Purdon 1936).
5. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912, 913 (1952); Fitz-
maurice V. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 181, 242 N.W. 526 (1932).
6. E.g., Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952); See,
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (1938) Prosser, Torts 904
(1941).
7. Prosser, Torts 1111, 1112 (1941).
8. Quatry v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa.
Super 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945) (In order to establish the liabilities of all parties pre-
paratory to enforcing their respective rights of contribution, Pennsylvania permits a de-
fendant to join a joint tortfeasor even though hIe is a spouse of the injured party. Of
course, the judgment cannot be enforced by the injured party against the spouse). See
Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693
(1951); Leflar, Contributions and Indemnity Between Joint Tortleasors, 81 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 130, 144 (1932).
9. Prosser, Torts 1111 (1941).
10. Yellow Cab. Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D. C. Cir. 1950); American
Auto Ins. Co. v. Moling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953); Norfolk Southern Ry.
Co v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601
229 N.W. 74 (1930).
11. Pa. Stat. Tit. 12 12081 (Purdon 1936).
RECENT CASES
sued by his spouse is entitled to reimbursement from his insurer.' 2 Conversely,
the presence of such a clause effectively bars recovery.1 -
Since Pennsylvania requires contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors
and thus would ordinarily allow the Railroad Company to enforce contribution
against the husband, the further question of whether the non-liability clause
should prevent the enforcement of contribution against the husband's insurer
is squarely posed. The manifest purpose of such a clause is to discourage
fraudulent and collusive law suits.14 It is at once apparent that this danger
is in no way lessened merely because the negligent joint tortfeasor rather than
the insured is seeking to recover from the insurer. Since the exclusion clause
will prevent the husband from obtaining payment directly from the insurer,
it should be equally effective to prevent a joint tortfeasor from indirectly ob-
taining such payment through enforcement of contribution. If, in the instant
case, the insurer has been compelled to indemnify the joint tortfeasor, the
indemnification would, for all practical purposes, have constituted payment
to the insured's wife. It is submitted that this result would be undesirable
as making the insurance policy applicable in contradiction of its express terms.
WALTER AURAN
PUBLIC TRIAL - EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC - The defendant
was accused of compulsory prostitution. The trial judge, shortly after the
start of the trial, on his own motion and over the defendant's objection, made
an order excluding the general public and press from the court room. Friends
and relatives of the defendant were allowed to remain. On appeal it was
held, that allowing only the friends and relatives of the accused to remain
in the court room did not satisfy the statutory' requirement of a public trial.
A statute providing for exclusion of the public from trials involving certain
sordid crimes2 must be strictly construed. The mere anticipation of the
introduction of obscene or indecent evidence is not sufficient justification for
excluding the public from trials for offenses not specifically designated in
the statute. People v. Jelke, 123 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1954).
Pennsylvania was the first state to grant the accused the common law right
12. Roberts v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 188 N.C. 795, 125 S.E.
611 (1924); cf. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
13. Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 88 Ga.App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953);
Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Geist, 270 Mich. 510, 259 N.W. 143 (1935);
Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953);Sibothan v.
Neubert, 168 S.W.2d 981 (Mo. 1943).
New York, by statute, permits spouses to sue each other but removes the incentive
by preventing collection from an insurer even in the absence of a non-liability clause in
the insurance policy. Insurance Law §109 Subd. 3-a.
14. See, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. James, 80 F.2d 802, 803, 804 (4th Cir.
1936); Tomlyanovich v. Tomylanovich, Sopra Note 13 at 58 N.W.2d 864; Cartier v.
Cartier, 84 N. H. 526, 528, 153 Atl. 6, 7 (1931.
1. N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §8 "In a criminal action, the defendant is
entitled: 1. To a speedy and public trial . . ."; N. Y. Civil Rights Law §12 "In all
criminal prosecution, the accused has the right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
2. N. Y. Judiciary Law §4 "The sittings of every court within this state shall be
public and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and
trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
sodomy, bastardy and filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all
persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers
of the court."
